Various mediation efforts to end the conflict in Darfur and to ease tension between Sudan and South Sudan have so far failed. The situation up and down the border seems only to be getting worse.

The failure to resolve a number of issues before South Sudan seceded, including  borders, security and oil, is being paid for now. Above all, the lack of a meaningful solution for the areas of Abyei, South Kordofan and Blue Nile were all too predictable sources of conflict.

The Disputed Territory of Abyei

The status of the disputed territory of Abyei remains unresolved, though it has been in the hands of the Sudanese Armed Forces since May 2011.  Indeed, Abyei has not held a referendum on whether to join the north or the south, which was due before the split. Neither have Blue Nile and South Kordofan had popular consultations about their future, which were also due before the split.

The Abyei region is often described as “oil-rich,” but after the 2009 Permanent Court of Arbitration ruling in The Hague, most of the oil fields now fall outside Abyei’s borders. It still produces oil, but the real issue here is more ethnic than economic.

Abyei is claimed by a southern group, the Dinka Ngok, as well as northern nomads, the Misseriya. There are several prominent Dinka Ngok in both the Sudan People’s Liberation Army, which fought for the south’s independence, and the SPLM, its political wing. After serious fighting in Abyei three years ago, the separate armies withdrew and agreed to joint patrols. Armed groups of Misseriya were often used as a proxy army by Khartoum during the civil war. The north fears alienating the Misseriya, who also live in the combustible neighboring state of Southern Kordofan. So both Khartoum and Juba have strong reasons to care about a seemingly insignificant patch of land.

Sharing Oil Revenues

Oil is the lifeline of both Sudan economies, and the South’s secession left Khartoum with output of about 125,000 barrels per day and South Sudan with production that has fallen slightly to 350,000 bpd from 375,000 bpd in June. Oil revenue is about 98 percent of South Sudan’s income, and is vital if the government is to develop a country devastated by years of civil war that is one of the world’s poorest nations. China is the biggest buyer of oil from the two countries, taking some 12.99 million barrels last year – five percent of China’s overall 2011 crude imports. China is also the biggest investor in South Sudan’s oilfields.

Exact Border Demarcation

People fleeing the fighting in those states have crossed the border to the south, and it appears the areas where they have gathered were bombed. It is estimated there are 800,000 to one million South Sudanese in Sudan. Since last autumn a further 300,000 have already made their way to South Sudan. Khartoum believes northern rebels have crossed into South Sudan to rest and recuperate before rejoining the fray. Whatever the truth, there is no doubt that these repeated incidents have further undermined Sudan and South Sudan’s already fragile relationship. The UN and the U.S. have both already condemned Sudan, and the flurry of denials from Sudanese officials suggest they must have at least some concerns about the damage the accusations are doing to their country’s standing. President Kiir has made it clear he will not let South Sudan return to war. But the increased tension cannot help the ongoing negotiations on post-secession matters, and the situation could potentially degenerate further.

By the end of January 2012, the two Sudans made a further step towards armed confrontation: The row heated up when Sudan said it was confiscating some of South Sudan’s oil exports to make up for what it called unpaid fees. Landlocked South Sudan has to use a northern pipeline and Port Sudan to export its crude, and the two countries are in dispute over the transit fees it should pay.

The seized crude was loaded onto three tankers between January 13 and 20, 2011, South Sudan’s justice ministry stated. Sudan sold one of those cargoes, a 600,000-barrel shipment loaded on the vessel Ratna Shradha, to a North Asian trader. The final price of the sale was unclear, but one trader said that the cargo was sold at a discount as steep as $14 a barrel. That would indicate an $8.4 million discount for the whole cargo versus the last official price charged by the South. In addition to the three, at least seven tankers are still waiting at the port to carry December and January cargoes, racking up demurrage costs of $20,000-$22,000 per day. Buyers include PetroChina, Glencore, Vitol, Trafigura and Arcadia.

Sudan is demanding $1 billion for unpaid transit fees since July 2011, plus $36 a barrel in the future as a transit fee, roughly a third of the export value of southern oil. Khartoum also wants Juba to share Sudan’s external debt of $38 billion.

South Sudan President Salva Kiir accused Khartoum of “looting” oil worth roughly $815 million and of building a tie-in pipeline to divert 120,000 barrels per day of southern oil flowing through the north. South Sudan retaliated by saying it would shut down its crude output, last estimated by officials at 350,000 bpd in November 2011. The main operator Petrodar was expected to close the key blocks 3 and 7. Petrodar is a consortium comprised mainly of Chinese firms: China National Petroleum Co. (CNPC), Sinopec and the Malaysian firm Petronas. Analysts estimate its total oil output from South Sudan at 250,000 bpd.

Opening an Alternative Oil Route

In parallel, South Sudan has been busy building an alternative route for its oil. Dhieu Dau, the South Sudan Oil Minister, said his government wanted to push ahead with plans to build an alternative pipeline to end dependency on northern export facilities. “We are planning that building an alternative pipeline will be a national duty for all South Sudanese and the plans are now being designed by the Ministry of Petroleum and Mining.” South Sudan has held talks with foreign firms to build a pipeline to Kenya, but oil industry insiders are skeptical since it would have to cross through rough and very difficult terrain.

In addition, oil production is going to be halved within a decade without significant new finds, according to the International Monetary Fund (IMF). South Sudan hopes to find oil in Jonglei state where France’s Total holds a largely unexplored oil license, but tribal violence has escalated there in recent weeks.

On another level, South Sudan has intensified its diplomatic offensive with the goal of consolidating American and Israeli support for its positions. In this context, President Salva’s recent impromptu visit to Israel could help the South Sudanese leader who came - inter alia – to get political and military support from Jerusalem  in the event of a confrontation with Sudan.

Growing aware of the possible armed confrontation between the two countries, Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir and South Sudan’s President Salva Kiir met on the sidelines of a meeting of East African officials in Ethiopia in late January in order to try to resolve their differences over the oil transit tariff. Sudan even declared its readiness to free tankers carrying cargoes of South Sudanese crude that it had seized earlier that month, in a push to defuse the row over transit fees between former civil war foes that both depend on oil for almost all their income.

However, Sudan’s President al-Bashir raised the tone on February 3. Asked in an interview with state television whether war could break out with South Sudan, Bashir said: “There is a possibility.” He said Sudan wanted peace, but added: “We will go to war if we are forced to go to war….If there will be war after the loss of oil it will be a war of attrition. But it will be a war of attrition hitting them before us.”

Finally, and against all odds, on February 10, Sudan and South Sudan signed a non-aggression pact in Addis Ababa mediated by Thabo Mbeki, the ex-president of South Africa, who said that both sides had agreed to respect each other’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. Mbeki also said that  both sides had pledged to “refrain from launching any attack, including bombardment.” The agreement aims to establish a monitoring mechanism to allow the two sides to lodge complaints if border disputes erupt.

Earlier, UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon had voiced his concern about the slow progress of the negotiations. “The moment has come for the leaders of both countries to make the necessary compromises, once again, that will guarantee a peaceful and prosperous future for both nations,” he said in a statement.

The negotiations were expected to continue with the goal of reaching a similar agreement on oil.

The likelihood of war between the two Sudans is still a very live possibility. The truce reached through the good offices of Mbeki remains fragile. It will remain so unless South Sudan totally complies with Sudan’s demands, which is unlikely. The situation on the ground is such that there will always be a reason for Sudan to tip the balance in its favor by waving high the specter of armed confrontation.

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Col. (ret.) Dr. Jacques Neriah, a special analyst for the Middle East at the Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs, was formerly Foreign Policy Advisor to Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin and Deputy Head for Assessment of Israeli Military Intelligence.

• The continued functioning of the PLO via the reformation of the Palestinian National Council, together with elections to the presidency and the parliament.

• The holding of a second meeting of the ad-hoc committee on revitalizing the PLO in Cairo on February 18.

• The creation of a national unity government of technocrats headed by “the president” (Abbas), whose task will be to implement the elections for the presidency and the parliament and to begin the rehabilitation of Gaza.

• To continue the activity of the committees set up by the reconciliation document signed by the two sides in Cairo in December, namely: the Public Freedom Committee, which is authorized to deal with the release of prisoners, the opening of institutions (including Hamas charitable societies) that were closed during the period of hostility between the sides, the return of Fatah activists to Gaza, the issuance of passports, and freedom of action; and the Community Reconciliation Committee, which is to deal with compensating the families of those killed in the violent clashes between Fatah and Hamas.

On the background of the signing of the agreement, Abbas announced as a confidence-building measure the release of 64 prisoners from Palestinian Authority (PA) prisons in the West Bank. Although the identities of the released prisoners have not been made clear, probably most of them belong to Hamas, given its strong demand to free all the “political prisoners” as an essential condition for reconciliation between the sides.

Initial Implications

The agreement makes Abbas the supreme authority for all PA institutions. In addition to heading Fatah, Abbas serves as leader of the PLO, chairman of the PA, and soon as Palestinian prime minister as well. Although appointing “the president” as prime minister contravenes Palestinian basic law, it served as a compromise to overcome Fatah-Hamas disagreement on this issue.

Although the words sound weighty, their practical significance is small since the Doha Declaration, similar to the Cairo reconciliation agreement that preceded it, does not express genuine Hamas recognition of Abbas’ leadership or his authority as leader of the Palestinian people. Instead, it is merely verbal, expedient recognition for tactical reasons, intended to enable Hamas’ official entry into the PLO in the framework of new elections for the Palestinian National Council and to pave the way for presidential and parliamentary elections.

The Hamas leaders are trying to implement the strategy of the Arab Spring in the Palestinian arena. They assume they will win an overwhelming majority in the elections to the representative Palestinian institutions and, thereby, complete their historic takeover of the Palestinian national movement. In other words, they view Abbas as the doorman who opens the gates to the Trojan horse.

Hamas sees no political significance in the envisaged Abbas-headed transition government. This is evident from the fact that its powers are limited to carrying out the presidential and parliamentary elections and working to rehabilitate Gaza. From Abbas’ perspective, his appointment as prime minister, in addition to president, will enable him to maintain the international recognition of the Palestinian government despite the agreement with Hamas, and give him room to maneuver in contacts with the international community, both politically and in terms of keeping the aid money flowing.

The Doha Declaration, like previous Fatah-Hamas agreements, emphasizes the need to implement the agreements between the sides – once again demonstrating the difficulty of achieving institutional unity in the Palestinian arena in light of Hamas’ declared ambition to assume senior status in representing the Palestinian people. The two sides will have to show great creativity to overcome the many obstacles facing the holding of elections, from unifying the separate civilian and security institutions in the West Bank and Gaza, to budget allocations.

Both sides have a basic interest in joining forces. Hamas, as noted, sees the move as an opportunity to attain seniority and rebuild its infrastructure in the West Bank. Fatah is drawn into the reconciliation by force of circumstances and awareness of the lessons and implications of the Arab Spring, which has led to the loss of its Egyptian support and the rise in power of the Muslim Brotherhood, the parent-movement of Hamas. It appears that the Fatah leaders prefer swimming with the current to sinking beneath it. Abbas thereby buys himself some quiet for an interim period. When it ends, though, he will likely find himself without assets and in a minority in the representative institutions of the Palestinian national movement.

Abbas’ cooperation with Mashaal, and his uncompromising refusal to meet with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, illustrates the strategic choice he has made. He does not prefer the path of a political settlement but, rather, to link up with Hamas and the other regional forces emerging in the Arab Spring and thereby use them as a force multiplier against Israel without having to offer political concessions. The release of the 64 prisoners is not only a gesture to Hamas but also an implicit message that the security cooperation with Israel is secondary in Abbas’ eyes to the old-new alliance with Hamas.

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Lt. Col. (ret.) Jonathan D. Halevi is a senior researcher of the Middle East and radical Islam at the Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs. He is a co-founder of the Orient Research Group Ltd. and is a former advisor to the Policy Planning Division of the Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Both U.S. pro-democracy groups, who say they take a neutral political stance, run programs to train members of nascent political parties in democratic processes. The work of NDI had fallen prey to what Egyptian pro-democracy campaigners say is a war between remnants of Mubarak’s inner circle and a rapidly developing civil society.

Since April 1, 2011, NDI has trained around 14,000 Egyptians in advocacy, voter education, and election monitoring, and has brought speakers with experience in democratic transitions to Egypt, including the former leaders of Poland and Chile.

Some Egyptian media pointed to American money poured into NGOs last year, to attempt to prove the existence of a U.S.-sponsored plot to subvert the course of change in Egypt. The U.S. ambassador to Cairo had spoken of “close to $40 million” invested in organizations including NDI and IRI.

The U.S. State Department said it was “very concerned” and urged authorities to stop the “harassment” of NGO staff. “This is not appropriate in the current environment,” U.S. State Department spokeswoman Victoria Nuland said, adding that senior U.S. officials (including President Barack Obama and Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta) had been in touch with Egyptian military leaders to express their concern over the raids.

Egypt’s military has vowed to investigate how pro-democracy and human rights organizations are funded and has repeatedly stated it will not tolerate foreign interference in the country’s affairs.

Documents and computers have been seized as part of the investigations and one report said that the IRI’s doors had been sealed with wax.

Reacting to the unusually severe reaction of the U.S., Egyptian authorities reassured the U.S. they will stop the raids on the offices of NGOs and that property seized in the raids would be returned to the groups, including the two U.S.-based groups.

Nevertheless, the Egyptian Authorities claimed that the raids were part of a probe by Egypt into allegations of illegal funding from abroad. Evidence suggested some groups were violating Egyptian laws, including not having permits to operate legally in Egypt. However, it seems that the steps undertaken were being orchestrated by the ruling generals to try to secure leverage over Washington while rallying support around anti-American sentiment and undermining the reputation of their most vocal critics in the Egyptian NGO community. These raids may be seen to be part of a broader move by the ruling military council to silence dissent after months of criticism of its human rights record. In recent months the military government has found itself the focus of protests, as activists questioned its commitment to democratic reform.

In August 2011, Egyptian authorities had announced the opening of an investigation into the alleged illegal funding of Egyptian NGOs with funds from abroad. Judicial sources said at the time that the survey was directed toward funds of U.S. origin. The survey comes as critics of the United States, close allies of the Egyptians for many years, are becoming more vocal against the government. Like other Western countries, on many occasions Washington deplored the violent repression carried out by security forces against demonstrators in recent weeks. Also in the firing line of the United States is the Egyptian army’s continuation of repressive legislation inherited from the old regime.

In the two months following the raids, none of the equipment, including computers and paper files, seized from both IRI and NDI has been returned to the organizations. U.S. State Department spokeswoman Victoria Nuland told reporters the situation is “unacceptable,” and called the foreign-funding charges “a very aggressive propaganda effort to scare the Egyptian people.” Faiza Aboul Naga, Egypt’s minister of international cooperation and a stalwart of former Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak, announced that the organizations were promoting political instability in Egypt, and that they would remain under investigation by the public prosecutor.

As if the raids were not enough to irritate the American administration, three Americans barred by authorities in Egypt from leaving the country have sought refuge at the U.S. embassy in Cairo as tensions sharply escalated. Egyptian authorities are preventing at least six Americans and four Europeans from leaving the country, citing an investigation opened after security forces raided the offices of ten international organizations. Egyptian officials defended the raid as part of a legitimate inquiry into the groups’ work and funding. Those banned include Sam LaHoud, son of U.S. transportation secretary Ray LaHoud, who heads the Egypt office of the IRI.

U.S. officials have warned that restrictions on civil society groups could hinder aid to Egypt, which would be a major blow to the country as it struggles with economic woes and continued turmoil since the popular uprising that led to Mubarak’s ouster last year. Egypt’s military has been locked in a confrontation for months with protesters who demand it immediately hand over power to civilians. Recent U.S. legislation could block annual aid to Egypt unless it takes certain steps. These include abiding by its 1979 peace treaty with Israel, holding free and fair elections, and “implementing policies to protect freedom of expression, association and religion and due process of law.”

The U.S. is due to give $1.3 billion in military assistance and $250 million in economic aid to Egypt in 2012. Washington has given Egypt an average of $2 billion in annual economic and military aid since 1979, according to the Congressional Research Service. Congress has approved this year’s payout, but it has also set conditions, including requiring that the secretary of state certify that the Egyptian government is supporting the transition. Aware of this condition, on February 4, 2012, after having met with Egypt’s foreign minister Mohammed Amr, Secretary of State Clinton issued a new warning to Egypt that the failure to resolve the bitter dispute over the status of non-governmental pro-democracy groups may lead to the loss of American aid to the country:

We are very clear that there are problems that arise from this situation that can impact all the rest of our relationship with Egypt….We do not want that. We have worked very hard this past year to put in place financial assistance and other support for the economic and political reforms that are occurring in Egypt….We will have to closely review these matters as it comes for us to certify whether any of these funds from our government can be made available under these circumstances.

In this context, Egypt’s military leader sacked the general responsible for media affairs to bolster an image tarnished by killings of protesters and accusations that the men in uniform are undermining Egypt’s democratic revolution. The change is the first in the military council since the generals took power from President Hosni Mubarak during the popular uprising last February.

Although it defused a violent confrontation by ushering Mubarak out, the military has also tried to crush subsequent protests by force, killing dozens. It has only grudgingly agreed to hand over power to a civilian president by June, and tried to protect its privileges and avoid civilian oversight.

The generals are not trusted by many young pro-democracy campaigners, who suspect they want to curtail civilian power by exploiting the fragile security situation.

Dozens died when the army tried to suppress protests on the streets of Cairo in November and December and video images of soldiers mistreating injured demonstrators sparked widespread anger. The army said troops were also killed. Army spokesmen blamed the violence on “invisible hands” determined to sow chaos among Egyptians and undermine the achievements of the uprising against Mubarak.

Egypt’s military ruler Field Marshall Tantawi has tried to improve the military’s public image, calling on Egyptians to unite behind the army and ordering the formation of a committee of generals to ensure positive media coverage.

Twelve months after the popular uprising erupted in Egypt, captivating the world and dislodging its authoritarian president, the question remains whether Egypt is on the right path and whether the revolution has delivered on its promise. The unity of last year’s revolution has given way to new realities and widening differences among Egyptians. The investigation against the NGOs shows how far Egypt has to go before such organizations can operate as freely as they do in much of the world, highlighting what Egyptian activists describe as the persistence of the Mubarak-era mentality – one of fear of allowing too much debate.

A year later the regime is still very much in place and the biggest mistake was entrusting the military with the keys to the revolution after it assumed power. The military has managed to outmaneuver other forces in the country (Islamists, revolutionary youth, liberals, the business elite and even foreign governments) by creating conditions on the ground whereby everybody discreetly feels the military should play a role in safeguarding the political process despite calls for its complete marginalization from political life. This is the new Egyptian reality and this is what the U.S. is realizing when confronting the SCAF on the NGOs and the process of democracy.

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Col. (ret.) Dr. Jacques Neriah, a special analyst for the Middle East at the Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs, was formerly Foreign Policy Advisor to Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin and Deputy Head for Assessment of Israeli Military Intelligence.

The uprising that toppled Muammar Gaddafi last year may be over but the militias remain in place. The National Transitional Council (NTC) and its army have not been able to persuade the militias to join the new armed forces, nor have they been able to rein them in. More interested in guarding their independence than in fostering national unity, the brigades from what are virtually city-states have rebuffed the NTC’s entreaties to disband. They have also refused to allow the NTC access to prisoners, leaving the council in the dark about the senior Gaddafi officials they hold. At a recent press conference, NTC vice chairman Abd al-Hafiz Ghoga confessed that the government does not know where Gaddafi’s former intelligence chief, Abdallah Sanussi, is being held. The Zintani fighters holding Saif al-Islam Gaddafi have refused to surrender him to the national authorities. Militias have also been accused of violence and crime in Tripoli.

However, over the past few weeks, units of the Libyan national army have stepped up their presence in Tripoli, urging regional militias to disband and join their forces. Many have scoffed at the offer, preferring instead to hold on to their heavy weapons. Tripoli is now an unruly patchwork of fiefdoms, each controlled by a different militia. Police are rarely seen – except when directing traffic – and there is no sign of the newly created national army.

Although their presence on the streets significantly declined toward the end of December, militias still occupy security compounds previously used by Gaddafi’s forces. Their presence increases in the streets of Tripoli as night falls.

Tripoli has two main militias. One is led by Abdel Hakim Belhadj, an Islamist who spent time in Taliban camps in Afghanistan and now runs his militia from a suite of rooms in a luxury Tripoli hotel. The other is headed by Abdullah Naker, a former electronics engineer who is openly disdainful of Belhadj.

Other militias include fighters from Zintan, an anti-Gaddafi bastion southwest of the capital that controls the international airport. Militias from Misrata, east of Tripoli, have mostly withdrawn from central Tripoli but maintain a presence in the eastern outskirts of the city. Fighters from the Berber, or Amazigh, ethnic minority mark out their territory with their blue, green and yellow flags.

The residents and militias of Tripoli have been trying for months to persuade the Misrata and Zintan fighters who stormed the capital to topple the regime to go back to their home towns, but those fighters are staying put – and are accused of harassing the locals. They see themselves as the ones who shouldered the greatest burden in the battle to drive out Gaddafi, and they are suspicious of edicts by the NTC, which they see as self-appointed interlopers from Benghazi (the NTC’s recognition by the West and Arab governments as Libya’s legitimate government notwithstanding). The fighters of Zintan and Misrata are in no hurry to subordinate themselves to a national army led by returned exiles and a government of which they’re wary; nor are they willing to accept the authority of the Tripoli Military Council headed by the Islamist Abdel Hakim Belhadj, despite his endorsement by the NTC.

Mindful of the political power that flows from being armed and organized, and determined to leverage that into a greater share of power and resources for the regions and towns they claim to represent, the regional militias are in no rush to give up their control of prized political real estate.

The new Libyan government is too weak to confront the brigades. It is concentrating efforts on more pressing matters, such as lobbying the international community to release its frozen assets. The deep fissures of tribe, region, ideology, and sometimes even neighborhood that divide rival armed groups persist – and there’s no sign yet of the emergence of a central political authority with the military muscle to enforce its writ.

With the government lacking the will and motivation to confront the brigades, the creation of a national fighting force to replace the regional units scattered throughout the country is unlikely to be accomplished anytime soon.

The hundreds of militia forces that sprang up during the country’s eight-month revolution ransacked the army’s depots, making off with thousands of anti-tank cannons and anti-aircraft guns. Now that the revolution is over and former leader Muammar Gaddafi is dead, Libya’s new government wants them to return the weapons to the armories. The army is trying to take advantage of the crumbling economy in order to entice militia members to join the army. Married men receive 500 Libyan dinars per month ($322), and single men receive 300 dinars ($194). If its plan to entice the militias with financial incentives proves untenable, the NTC may have to coerce the brigades to disband. But with the country trying to turn the page after eight months of bloodshed, it is a step the council is reluctant to take.

While months of air strikes and a few hundred Qatari Special Forces troops on the ground proved to be enough to shatter Colonel Gaddafi’s regime, the Western Alliance could not – nor did it intend to – fill the resultant security void. NATO and its partners simply recognized the Benghazi-based NTC and its allied armed formations as the legitimate authority, supplied it with aid and resources, and hoped for the best.

The problem, of course, was that the Libyan rebels were never an army; they were a patchwork of small local militia units, deserters from the regular army, and a smattering of former exiles with military experience. Moreover, the recognition extended by foreign powers to the NTC was far in advance of the extent to which Libyans, even many of those in the forefront of the battle to oust Gaddafi, were willing to accept its lead. The fact that the rebel leadership had not established an alternative power center meant that the collapse of Gaddafi also meant an effective collapse of state authority.

The challenge now facing the rebels is to build a new state on the ruins of the old, and the first order of state-building business is establishing a monopoly on military force within its borders. The NTC is struggling to meet that challenge. The situation is particularly grim for residents of towns and neighborhoods thought to have supported Gaddafi, which are routinely subject to abuse by fighters. The NTC may talk of “national reconciliation,” but it has precious little control over fighters whose actions imperil that objective. Instead, the NTC is forced to accommodate them.

Even as tribal and regional schisms intensify the sometimes violent contest among the different militia formations, the alienation of communities that had supported Gaddafi’s regime also creates fertile soil for an insurgency. There are certainly plenty of men of fighting age (many of them armed) who fought for the old regime. In some Tripoli neighborhoods, pro-Gaddafi graffiti still reportedly goes up nightly. And British officials warned late last month that a number of top al-Qaeda leaders have left Pakistan for Libya, looking to take advantage of the security vacuum to set up shop.

Interestingly, the main channel of propaganda of the old Gaddafi regime, Al-Jamahiriya, has resumed its broadcasts on the Egyptian satellite Nilesat, provoking the ire of ex-rebel fighters. The channel, which had stopped broadcasting in the wake of the “liberation of Tripoli” in late August, reappeared under a new frequency, broadcasting speeches and songs in praise of the former “Guide” Gaddfai, killed in Sirte. The news of this has made ​​the rounds of social networks, and some have called for demonstrations outside the Egyptian embassy.

The security challenges would be more manageable if a political consensus existed on the terms for building a new democratic state in Libya, but that, too, remains elusive. The NTC has been beset with challenges over its less than transparent composition and process of selection – in December it even faced a tent-city protest established outside its headquarters to demand that it disclose its membership and make public its decisions.

The Misrata and Zintan militias don’t trust the Benghazi rebel leadership, and they shamelessly use their military muscle to demand a greater share of the political pie until their political demands have been met. Last month, an umbrella group claiming to represent 70 percent of militia fighters demanded that the NTC grant them 40 percent of its seats. The conflict among the militia is inherently political: It’s the form in which rival tribal and regional groupings are staking their claim to power and resources in the post-Gaddafi order. And it’s far from clear how the formal political system being put in place to regulate such competition will ease tensions. Yet, the criteria by which the NTC selects its own members has not been made public.

The draft law setting rules for elections to be held in June that the Council released for discussion suggests that the promise of elections may not resolve the emerging schisms. The draft evades the highly-charged issue of districting, meaning that there’s no clarity on how many seats in the new legislature will be allocated to each town and region, a decision that will shape the distribution of oil wealth in the new system. The draft law also plans to exclude as candidates those who hold positions in the current interim government and its local and military councils, officials of the former regime and those deemed to be late adopters of the revolutionary cause.

This is the downside of “intervention lite”: It’s a lot easier to take down a regime, as the U.S. learned in Iraq, than it is to establish a new order. Yet in Libya, the forces trying to establish that new order are far weaker than those in Iraq, even if some of their leaders — most notably NTC President Mustafa Abul Jalil — enjoy the advantage of a legitimacy never accorded to the U.S. in Iraq. Given the mounting threat of chaos, Jalil’s authority may not be enough.

The militias’ dominance in Libya has now reached a crucial crossroads, with the recent appointment of a chief of staff for the new national army. Until now, the militias have said they cannot surrender their weapons and allow their fighters to be absorbed into the army because the command structure was not in place. By naming Yousef al-Manqoush, a retired general from Misrata, as head of the armed forces, the NTC presents the militias with a choice – they must either start ceding control to the army or openly defy Libya’s leadership.

In an interview broadcast on Libyan television, al-Manqoush said the mechanism for absorbing former militia fighters into the military would be ready soon. “My message to the revolutionaries is…they have to prove to the world once again that they are patriotic Libyans, prove to world that they will integrate into the state’s institutions and work on building a strong national military,” he told Libya Al Hurra television.

Almost three months since the country’s liberation was formally declared, Libya feels calmer and less volatile than many had predicted. But the continuing presence of the militias is seen as a serious – and growing – threat to stability. Disarming them and persuading them to integrate within the national forces is now arguably the greatest challenge facing this fledgling government as it tries to establish security before elections planned later this year.

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Col. (ret.) Dr. Jacques Neriah, a special analyst for the Middle East at the Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs, was formerly Foreign Policy Advisor to Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin and Deputy Head for Assessment of Israeli Military Intelligence.

Indeed, the apparent Free Syrian Army (FSA) had signaled cracks in the coalition of forces rallied around Bashar Assad, certainly in his most powerful bastion. However, it looks as if the FSA has lost its momentum and has not been successful in rallying entire units of the Syrian army to its cause. Up until now, army desertions have been decisions made by individuals who have rallied against the regime on a personal level, mostly Sunni recruits and professional soldiers/officers who joined the ranks of the FSA due to their resentment against the Alawite regime and its behavior in cracking down on the opposition.

As a result, a stalemate has been reached between the parties. Opposition forces, as well as the regime, are unable at this point to project enough power to tip the balance in their favor. Such a situation could mean that Syria is entering a stage of civil war that could last an indefinite time. This in turn would mean that Bashar Assad would still run the country in the near future and that his accelerated fall and the demise of the Alawite regime could only be the result of a massive intervention by external forces that seem to be active today but have not yet decided to upgrade their activities against the regime.

A similar stalemate was reached in Libya a few months ago. It was NATO’s decision to implement a no-fly zone and the massive U.S. intelligence and command assistance given to the rebel forces in Libya, as well as air strikes conducted mainly by French and British forces, that finally tipped the balance and brought an end to the Gaddafi regime.

However, at this point one should exclude the foreign military intervention option. Syria is not Libya and its army is well trained to face such an extreme situation. In order to succeed, military action against Syria would have to be a replica of the Iraqi scenario, which is very unlikely today.

Moreover, such a scenario could quickly degenerate into a regional conflict, as referred to by Assad himself in some of his interviews and speeches, and allow him to escape from his doomed fate. A military attack on Syria by a Western-led coalition could trigger a reaction involving Iran and Hizbullah that could very quickly focus on Israel, which would thus become the scapegoat of the Syrian regime. This scenario could develop quickly into an armed conflict, with dire consequences for all parties involved.

Having said that, there is still room for covert operations conducted by special forces; arms deliveries; intelligence collection; operational command training, and other means that could transform the FAS into a formidable enemy of the regime. The FSA is already enjoying a safe haven in Turkey, where its forces are being trained before being sent to combat zones. One can easily assess that such activity already exists on a small scale and it could become important with the mobilization of greater combat forces against Assad.

Since a “greater” military option is unlikely at present, it seems that the only way to fight the regime from the outside resides in a combination of political and economic actions against Syria. Such actions are already being carried out, but they need to be intensified in order to put significant pressure on the regime and to force Assad to decide about radical options. How long can Assad survive an international boycott, Arab rejection of his regime, and widespread castigation of his brutal behavior?

How long will his security forces and army rally around him before he is asked by his generals to step down, as in the case of Egypt’s Mubarak, Yemen’s Salah, and Tunisia’s Ben Ali? Even worse, in a grimmer scenario, where will the gunman who will shoot at Assad come from if not from his closest associates, in order to protect their own interests?

On another level, how long will it take the U.S., France, and the UK to convince Russia and China to turn away from Assad and allow effective sanctions at the UN Security Council?

The longer the rebellion continues and succeeds in hitting institutional and security targets, the more Assad and his praetorian guards will be weakened. Eventually they will be forced to make painful decisions – step down, go into honorable exile, or end up like Gaddafi.

*     *     *

Col. (ret.) Dr. Jacques Neriah, a special analyst for the Middle East at the Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs, was formerly Foreign Policy Advisor to Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin and Deputy Head for Assessment of Israeli Military Intelligence.

This party is the political wing of the Uniqueness and Reform movement which represents the Muslim Brotherhood in Morocco. Its victory constitutes a further triumph for the Islamist movement in the context of the “Arab Spring,” so soon after the victory of the Ennahda movement in the Tunisian elections.

In Egypt, the three-stage elections begin on 28 November 2011, and the Muslim Brotherhood has a chance to make substantial gains. The Muslim Brotherhood in Syria, which is fighting to overthrow the Alawite regime of Assad, is backed by Turkey, which regards it as an alternative to the existing government. In Libya, the new government has undertaken to make Sharia law a primary source of legislation. In Yemen, the Islamist movements have played a central role in the revolt against the rule of Ali Abdullah Saleh. Earlier, in 2006, the Hamas movement – the branch of the Muslim Brotherhood in the Palestinian territories – triumphed in the Palestinian Authority elections, and since then Hamas has entrenched its rule in Gaza and, for all intents and purposes, has become an independent political entity.

The Muslim Brotherhood branches in the various countries are full partners to the worldwide movement’s ideology. Each one, however, has freedom of action to devise its own tactics in line with specific political conditions. In Morocco, the Justice and Development Party chose to downplay the extreme Islamist message and mainly focus on fighting corruption and improving the economy, issues that took the lion’s share of its electoral platform.

That platform, in its brief political section, stated that the party would aim to strengthen dialogue and cooperation with all of the EU countries and Canada while, in Morocco’s relations with the United States, pursuing an appropriate diplomacy and safeguarding national interests. The formulation in the Israeli context was restrained, and included a commitment to the “defense of the just issues of the people and first and foremost the issue of Palestine, and the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination and the establishment of its independent state whose capital is Jerusalem, the Palestine problem being a national problem.”1

The ideological platform of the parent party, the Uniqueness and Reform movement, reveals its true Islamist face. The section on the movement’s goals states that it seeks to instill the Islamic religion in the heart of the individual, the family, the society, the state, and the ummah, and to help spread Islam throughout the world.2 The movement expressed unequivocal support for the armed struggle against Israel in the context of the Second Intifada, and for the terror attacks against U.S. forces in Iraq. It referred to “Zionist and American aggression” as “the greatest and most dangerous manifestations of terror that modern history has known.”3

In recent years Abdelilah Benkirane, leader of the Justice and Development Party and the designated prime minister, has made harshly anti-Israel statements that deny Israel’s right to exist and favor the armed struggle against it. Below are some quotations from his words.

From an interview to the Al-Mashaal weekly in 2011:

As for Israel, it has a special status. It is not like the United States but rather, in our view, a state that is waging a war against the people of Palestine. We, not as the Muslim Arab people but as the Moroccan people, do not see the Palestinian problem as a problem of our brothers the Palestinians alone, but as our own problem….If Israel were to live with the Palestinians within a single state as occurred in South Africa, our position would change. However, at present we regard Israel as a hostile state.4

From an interview to the Hamas website that is documented on the Uniqueness and Reform movement’s website, at the time of Benkirane’s arrival in Gaza in March 2009:

The inhabitants of Arab Morocco do not think there is only a duty to identify with the Palestinians, but want to wage a jihad struggle alongside them….Most unfortunately, the political circumstances, the borders, the soldiers, and the legal and military barriers that exist between the Muslims prevent these feelings from being expressed as they should….The Moroccans see the Islamic resistance movement Hamas as the mother of resistance and steadfastness. The Moroccans very much love the Hamas movement…and they love to recall at every occasion the acts of heroism and sacrifice of this great and mighty movement….All of the Moroccans stand beside the Palestinians and the noble Al-Quds [Jerusalem], and if the borders are opened to the Moroccans and the obstacles are removed, you will see how the masses come to help Al-Aqsa and Al-Quds.5

Benkirane, along with tens of other Muslim religious savants, signed two manifestos that openly declare support for jihad as the only way to liberate Palestine in its entirety and call for a hostile stance toward the United States. Below are quotations from the manifestos.

From the manifesto in support of Gaza:

No condemnation of the [Palestinian] struggle; instead, recognition of its legitimacy….Official condemnation of the U.S. stance of supporting and assisting the occupying entity and a call to ambassadors to hold consultations and reconsider relations [with the United States]….The importance of seeking to prepare an untrammeled Islamic legal manifesto that will clarify the Islamic dimension of the Palestine issue and the legitimacy of the jihad and the struggle against the occupying Jews….Adoption of the approach of an economic boycott against Israel and the Zionist entity….An economic jihad to help our brethren in Gaza….Emphasis on support for the path of struggle and for the legitimate jihad in Palestine as the means of its liberation.6

From the manifesto calling for the lifting of the siege on the Palestinian people:

We the undersigned on this manifesto emphasize the complete support of the ummah for the legal and noble Islamic position of the leaders of the Palestinian people, who belong to Hamas and other jihad organizations, in refusing to recognize the state of “Israel” and its fraudulent right to exist in Palestine. We regard recognition [of Israel] as a violation of the tenets of Islamic law and the consensus of the ummah….

We emphasize the right of the Muslim Palestinian people to struggle aggressively for its land…and we view this resistance as legally, Islamically mandated warfare and a political interest, it being forbidden to call for its condemnation or evade it.

We regard every signature on agreements or treaties that renounce the right of struggle, or the right of return of the refugees, or the right of the Islamic identity of Al-Quds in particular and of Palestine in general, as an offense to the ummah, a deviation from its fundamental principles, and a sacrifice of its interests.

We view the jihad-fighting Palestinian resistance, with all of its organizations, as one of the shining stars in the skies of jihad-fighting Islam….

The undersigned affirm to the masses of the ummah that the duty of liberating Jerusalem and rescuing the captured Al-Aqsa Mosque is not only a duty of the Palestinians alone but of the entire ummah, and therefore solidarity with those who cling tenaciously to the sacred land is not an act of voluntary will but, rather, an Islamic legal obligation and a historical responsibility.7

In sum, the media’s accounts of a “moderate” Justice and Development Party winning the Moroccan elections do not accurately reflect this party’s ideology. The purported “moderation” is a tactic aimed at gaining a political foothold, a capacity, as part of the government, to enhance the public’s readiness for Islamic jurisprudence as the source of the country’s constitution and laws.

A party that is a wolf in sheep’s clothing has won the Moroccan elections, and despite its platform’s declarative commitment to strengthen ties with the West, the party’s outlook, its leaders’ statements, and the platform of its parent party point clearly to the stance of the Muslim Brotherhood, which is hostile to the West and its culture and views Israel as a cardinal enemy. The victory of the Muslim Brotherhood in Morocco further energizes the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt for the elections beginning on November 28, and encourages the Brotherhood’s branches that are fighting the existing regime in other countries. The domino effect that began with the revolt in Tunisia is coloring the Middle East green, as the Islamic revolution gradually alters the regional balance of power and, eventually, could well forge a new front to challenge the existing world order.

*     *     *

Notes

1. http://www.profvb.com/vb/t83549.html.

2. http://www.alislah.ma/images/stories/mitak.pdf.

3. http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&ved=0CBsQFjAA&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.alislah.ma%2Fcomponent%2Fk2%2Fitem%2Fdownload%2F33.html&ei=3M7RTsvHIOLd0QGxnM0l&usg=AFQjCNHF4vqKa_rZcki3RLMmQDsKu4B26Q&sig2=XxzzY746623ViJKZjn8Kbw.

4. http://www.marsadmag.org/index.php/2011-07-02-10-07-50/114-2011-10-01-03-32-53 הראיון נערך בשנת 2011.

5. http://67.15.234.95/~alislah/index.php?option=com_k2&view=item&id=10398:%20%20&Itemid=8.

6. http://www.saaid.net/mktarat/flasteen/231.htm.

7. http://almoslim.net/node/83562.

*     *     *

Lt. Col. (ret.) Jonathan D. Halevi is a senior researcher of the Middle East and radical Islam at the Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs. He is a co-founder of the Orient Research Group Ltd. and is a former advisor to the Policy Planning Division of the Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Eight months after the beginning of the popular uprising, the Assad regime in Syria seems to be headed down a descending slope with no hope of return. With more than 4,500 civilians killed by Assad’s Praetorian guard since the beginning of the protests and hundreds of his loyalists killed by opposition forces, Syria seems to be immersed in a bloody civil war whose sides are not always clear and whose end can only be through a violent confrontation between loyalists and rebels.

Assad is facing mounting international isolation as Syria’s membership in the Arab League has been suspended. Except for Iran and Hizbullah, Assad has no other friends to rely on. Even Russia and China have expressed their reservations, though they are not yet ready to join the international community led by the U.S. and Europe in boycotting the regime and sanctioning it over its inhumane behavior.

Assad’s regime has shown a blatant incapacity to quell the rebellion against the regime. The gradual involvement of regular army units together with the continuous presence of internal intelligence and security forces famous for their cruelty and savagery (the Shabiha – the phantoms) has not brought the regime any relief. The more the violence has increased, the more individuals choose to join the opposition. The harsh behavior of the regime has provoked a snowball reaction. The rebellion, which was limited in the beginning to a few areas in Syria, has gained much terrain and involves both remote areas and those close to the center of power in Damascus. The rebels are active in rural areas where the government finds it difficult to reach and to operate in force and fight, as well as in main urban areas such as Homs, Hamat, Latakia, Damascus, Dar’aa, Dir el Zor, and others.

Adopting the Libyan precedent, while being aware of the limitations of power of the West, the FSA has called for a no-fly zone and two buffer zones with international backing, one in the north on the Turkish-Syrian border and another in the south near the border with Jordan.

Most important, the rebels have secured a formidable ally: Turkey. Indeed, after having had a brief “honeymoon” with Assad, Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan has chosen not only to distance himself from the Syrian Alawite regime, but has provided all the facilities for the opposition forces on its territory, which serves both as a refuge and as an area of organization, a country funds can be raised. The official FSA website even gives the details of bank accounts in Turkish banks.

The cracks in the Syrian regime’s structure, which were invisible or non-existent at the beginning of the protest, have become clearer. The Assad regime has always had to face opposition forces and has managed over the years to ignore them officially while fighting them behind the scenes.  The innovation today is that dissident Syrian officers have organized into a structure – the FSA – which is fighting the regime openly.

The FSA recently formed an interim military council headed by dissident Col. Riyad al-Ass’ad and nine other colonels. It is headquartered in a camp in Turkey’s southern province, close to the Syrian border and its field command inside Syria. Al-Ass’ad’s deputy is Col. Malik Kurdi, and Col. Ahmad Hijazi is the chief-of-staff.

According to opposition sources, the FSA exceeds 20,000 troops in total and is organized in 23 fighting battalions (see Appendix), each carrying the name of an Islamic hero or of “martyrs” killed by forces loyal to Assad.

The birth of the FSA on July 29, 2011, and its ongoing covert and open military actions is a development that cannot be underestimated or ignored. Exactly as in the Libyan case, if the regime falls, it will probably fall only in the aftermath of the defeat of the forces loyal to the present regime. Until now, the opposition forces were led by civilians. But today the armed confrontation is in the hands of rebel professional soldiers who seem to attract new recruits to their forces day after day. The objective is well-known and well-defined: to bring down the regime.

Riyad al-Ass’ad has emphasized that the FSA has no political goals except the liberation of Syria from Bashar Assad’s regime. The FSA has also stated that the conflict is not sectarian and that their ranks include Alawis who oppose the regime. On September 23, the FSA merged with the Free Officers Movement (Harakat al-Dubbat Al-Ahrar) and became the main opposition military group.

However, the FSA has a fundamental disagreement with the Syrian National Council (SNC), a body that represents all the political forces opposed to Assad, over the principle of militarizing the “revolution,” since the SNC is committed to maintaining peace. Moreover, there is no agreement between the two bodies as to the participation of the military in the political process that will follow Assad’s removal from power.

Indeed, in a statement published by the military council one can clearly discern the growing antagonism between the civilians and the military. In their statement, the officers claim that the council will exercise the functions of an amnesty committee, seeking to override all judgments and sentences undertaken by military and civilian courts concerning the events in Syria since their outbreak. The military council’s headquarters will be in Damascus, and it will also adopt the same flag chosen by the Syrian National Council. The military council would have the right to contact foreign governments, organizations or individuals, or military entities within Syrian territory or abroad. It has also announced the formation of a military tribunal for the revolution in order to hold accountable members of the regime who are proven to have been involved in killings or attacks on Syrian citizens, or the destruction of public or private property. Col. al-Ass’ad has appointed a judge for this purpose, and military court provisions will be applied to the tribunal.

Finally, beyond the considerations related to relations between civilians and the military, the fate of the revolt against Assad will be sealed only if growing segments of the Syrian population join the fight against the regime. One such group is the Kurds. Although they are alienated from the growing role Turkey is playing today in support of the Syrian opposition to Assad, the Kurds do represent a sizeable presence in the backbone of the fighting against the regime. Some even assess that the fate of the revolution may reside in the hands of that community. Syrian Kurds make up between 15 and 20 percent of the total Syrian population, making them Syria’s largest minority group. As in other Arab countries and in Turkey, the Syrian Kurds have been a repressed minority. Besides laws against the use of their own language and against their holding passports and ID cards, Syria has confiscated their land and given it to Arab Bedouins.

Kurds have been involved in the fighting against the regime since the beginning of the protests. The assassination of Kurdish opposition member Mishal Tammo in early October in the northern city of Qamishli hardened many Kurds’ resolve against the regime. However, as much as the Kurds appeared willing to turn against Assad, they have been very suspicious of the SNC, which did not give the Kurds proper representation in the SNC Council and General Assembly (4 seats in the 29-member secretariat and 22 seats in the 230-member body).

It is still too early to assess the positions of the FSA and the SNC in international affairs beyond the basic fact that these two bodies carry a growing hostility toward Iran and its ally – Hizbullah, while being open to a deep relationship with Turkey and probably with the U.S., France, and the UK. It seems they are trying to follow the Libyan example. (Libya’s Transitional National Council [TNC] has been the only international body to recognize the Syrian opposition.) This means, in other words, that the Syrian opposition is relying greatly on the West to help topple the Syrian regime; hence, the use of the symbol of Iwo Jima.

*     *     *

Appendix

As of October 2011, the Free Syrian Army claims to have twenty-three battalions:

• Abd el-Rahman Al-Shaykh Ali battalion
• ‘Omari battalion (Daraa/Hauran)
• Sultan Basha Al-Atrash battalion (As-Suwayda)
• Qashoush battalion (Hama city)
• Ahmad Nayif Al-Sukhni battalion (Ar-Raqqah)
• Mo’az Al-Raqad battalion (Deir ez-Zor province)
• ‘Omar Ibn al-Khattab battalion (Deir ez-Zor city)
• Khalid bin Walid battalion (Homs city)
• Hamzah Al-Khateeb battalion (Idlib city)
• Al-Harmoush battalion (Idlib province)
• Salaheddine Al-Ayoubi battalion (Jisr ash-Shugur)
• Abil Fidaa battalion (Hama province)
• S’aad Bin Mo’az battalion (Hama province)
• Mo’awiyah Bin Abi Sufian (Damascus city)
• Abu ‘Obeidah bin Al-Jarrah battalion (Damascus province)
• Houriyeh battalion (Aleppo city)
• Ababeel battalion (Aleppo province)
• Qassam battalion (Jableh)
• Suqur battalion (Latakia)
• Samer Nunu battalion (Baniyas)
• Mishaal Tammo battalion (Qamishli)
• Odai Al-Tayi battalion (Hasakah)
• Allahu Akbar battalion (Abu Kamal)

*     *     *

Col. (ret.) Dr. Jacques Neriah, a special analyst for the Middle East at the Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs, was formerly Foreign Policy Advisor to Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin and Deputy Head for Assessment of Israeli Military Intelligence.

The importance of elections in Tunisia is not only which party won the majority for the Constituent Assembly, but the real significance is the participation of almost 90 percent of voters in the election process, and as a result the emergence of a new political landscape that characterizes the Tunisian political scene.

In the elections, political parties had to contest 217 seats for the Constituent Assembly in 33 districts. The names on each list were required to alternate between men and women. However, many parties did not place female candidates at the top of their candidate lists.

There were a total of 11,686 candidates on 1,517 lists: 828 running with political parties, 655 running as independents, and 34 running with party coalitions. Each governorate elected between four and ten representatives. The total number of parties contesting the election was about 100.

Tunisian expatriates elected their representatives on 20–22 October 2011. In the six national districts (18 seats) – Al Nahda (the Islamist Renaissance party) gained 9 seats, CPR (Congress for the Republic) won 4, Ettakatol (The Democratic Forum for Labor and Liberties) won 3 seats, the Ettajdid (Renewal) movement won 1, and Aridha Chaabia (Popular Petition for Justice and Development) won 1.

The final results were published on 28 October for the composition of Tunisia’s Constituent Assembly which will draft the constitution:

• As expected, Al Nahda, the Islamist party, won 41 percent (90 seats), including 42 of the 49 women elected to the Constituent Assembly.
• 34 percent (73 seats) went to the big liberal parties (CPR, Ettakatol, PDP-The Progressive Democratic Party, Ettajdid)
• 9 percent (19 seats) went to the Popular Petition led by London-based millionaire and Arab satellite TV station owner Al Hashemi Al Hamedy. The party had won 28 seats, but due to financial irregularities lost 9 seats, including in the Sidi Bouzid area, where many of the votes were “bought” by the party.
• 4 percent (9 seats) went to parties aligned with Ben Ali’s regime (Afek Tounes, Mubadara).

The Constituent Assembly will have a one-year mandate to draft a new constitution for Tunisia. The original constitution from 1959 heavily favors the president. The fact that 49 women are now part of the body-politic is important in itself. Tunisia’s women already enjoy greater liberty, equality, and protection than those in other Arab states. The country has legalized abortion, banned polygamy, granted equal divorce rights, and a enacted a legal code explicitly outlawing spousal rape, domestic violence, and sexual harassment.

Moreover, the Assembly is expected to appoint or elect a new president who in turn will form the transitional government of the country for the duration of its term. Once the draft constitution is submitted to a popular vote for acceptance, elections to the Assembly will choose a president who will form the next Tunisian government.

The leader of the Al Nahda party made it very clear that since this party was the big winner in these elections, it ought to head the transitional government, and for that purpose, party leader Rached Ghannouchi designated his second-in-command, former journalist Hamadi Jebali, for that post.

Ghannouchi reiterated that he would not be a candidate for the post of transitional president, but declared that this position should be filled by a person who had fought against the Ben Ali regime. The names mentioned today in Tunisian political circles include Mustafa Ben Jaabar, head of the leftist party Al Takkatol; Moncef Marzouki, head of the leftist nationalist CPR; and Ahmed Mestiri, the historical opponent of former president Habib Bourghiba.

Ghannouchi’s world view was influenced by the writings of Muslim Brotherhood theorists like Sayyed Qutb.¹ His influence in North Africa went beyond the borders of Tunisia; in the 1990s he helped draft the platform of the Algerian FIS (Front Islamique du Salut). In 1991, he attended Hassan Turabi’s Islamist Conferences in Sudan which brought together members of the Muslim Brotherhood, Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and Afghan mujahideen.²

Perhaps because of his background, Ghannouchi also took care to calm Tunisians who did not vote for him, including those who called him a “terrorist” on his way to the polling station. Ghannouchi declared that his intention was to establish a secular, pluralistic society, to respect personal liberties, including women’s rights, and repeated forcefully that Tunisia remained committed to all its international obligations, treaties, and agreements. There was no intention for Tunisia to change its policies regarding foreign tourism when this sector represents 10 percent of the country’s internal revenue (tourism created revenue of 780 million euros for the period between January and September 2011, almost 40 percent less than the same period a year earlier). In one of numerous interviews, he promised to preserve “historical friendly relations with the U.S.,” to strengthen relations with “our brothers” Libya and Algeria, and to preserve Tunisia’s openness towards Europe.

The results of the elections in Tunisia have created a new situation. Even though the Islamists have won a plurality of the seats (over 40 percent), still, nearly 60 percent of the vote went to mostly secular groups that heavily rely on leftist and socialist ideologies. Al Nahda has no other choice but to compromise and form a coalition government that relies on a fair distribution of portfolios and an accepted political agenda in order to survive as a ruling party. Moreover, the number of parties elected and the sizeable number of independents reflect a splintered electorate, possibly turning Tunisia into a quasi-Italian model of democracy that is prone to instability. Two political forces share the future of Tunisia’s transition. It is false and fallacious to think that the future is solely in the hands of Al Nahda. Bearing in mind that leftist and liberal parties also represent almost 40 percent of the seats, Tunisia’s transition could be solid and sustainable and possibly closer to the Turkish model rather than the Italian one.

Indeed, Tunisians champion syncretism – the combining of different beliefs, and this is the crux of Tunisia’s political culture. Tunisians do not wish to ditch their Arab and Islamic heritage. Nor do they wish to detach from the brighter spots of reformist politics in their history. French and European input into the mix of Tunisian culture is now deep-rooted and appreciated.

Dr. Amor Boubakri, professor of law at the University of Sousse, eloquently summarized the situation by saying that Tunisians have realized what was expected of them for making the Arab Spring’s first election a resounding success. For him, this is the most important election in the history of Tunisia. This election inaugurates democratic transition, pluralism, power-sharing, organized opposition, and gender inclusiveness as never before.

It remains to be seen whether the Tunisian example will serve as an inspiration to its neighbors.

*  *  *

Notes

1. Azzam Tamimi, Rachid Ghannouchi: A Democrat within Islamism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001, pp. 20-29.

2. Roland Jacquard, In the Name of Osama Bin Laden: Global Terrorism and the Bin Laden Brotherhood (Durham: Duke University Press, 2002), p. 110. See also Martin Kramer, “Islam in the New World Order,” in Ami Ayalon (ed.), Middle East Contemporary Survey, Volume XV, 1991 (Boulder: Westview Press, 1993), pp. 182-183.

Others believe that the Palestinian consensus is intransigent on the issue. They predict that after an Israeli withdrawal to the 1967 lines, a future Palestinian state will pursue its struggle for full implementation of the “right of return,” which means resettling the Palestinians in Tel Aviv, Jerusalem, Haifa, and many other communities, and in fact bringing about the destruction of the State of Israel.

In 2008, the uncompromising Palestinian adherence to the “right of return” was anchored in legislation passed by the Palestinian Parliament and ratified by PA Chairman Mahmoud Abbas. (The stances of the Fatah movement, the Palestine Liberation Organization [PLO], and the PA regarding the “right of return” were analyzed in detail in The Palestinian Refugees on the Day after Independence.1)

The provisions of the “Right of Return” Law block any possibilities of compromise and political flexibility for Palestinian negotiators and prohibit even the slightest amendment of this right. Understanding the Palestinian political stance is highly important for shaping future Israeli policy.

The following is a translation of the Palestinian “Right of Return” Law, which clearly indicates what the Palestinian leadership really means when discussing the rights of refugees and demanding the implementation of UN Resolution 194:

The Law of The Right of Return of the Palestinian Refugees2

No. 1 of year 2008

Chairman of the Executive Committee of the Palestine Liberation Organization

President of the Palestinian National Authority

After reviewing the Basic Law and its amendments and in particular Article 41 thereof; after reviewing the rules of procedure of the  Legislative Council, and in particular Article 71 thereof; based on decisions of the Legislative Council at its meeting on November 22, 2007; having considered the letter of transmittal of the Legislative Council to the President of the Palestinian National Authority on December 8, 2007 and on behalf of the Arab Palestinian people, we have issued the following law:

Article 1

Definitions

The below-mentioned words and phrases in this law have the following meanings unless the context indicates otherwise:

The Palestinian refugee: Any Palestinian, and/or his/her descendents, who was deprived or  is being deprived by the Zionist occupation from permanent residence in his/her original community in historic Palestine, and is being deprived from receiving full citizenship rights in it [historic Palestine], regardless of the date in which his right was denied, the way it was denied, immigration, displacement, deportation, expulsion, absence, naturalization, deprivation or any other measures denying his right of return.

Right of return of the Palestinian refugee: This is the right of return of the Palestinian refugees, who reside inside and outside Palestine, to their homes, property and rights in any part of historic Palestine, and [right] of compensation for the refugees and their descendants for past and future moral and material damages and/or damages to their property, houses and rights, [damages] which occurred directly or indirectly due to becoming refugees starting at that time until their return.

Article 2

The right of return of the Palestinian refugees to their homes and property, and receiving compensation for their suffering, is an inalienable and enshrined right that cannot be compromised, replaced, reconsidered, interrelated or posed to a referendum.

Article 3

The right of return is natural, personal, collective, civil, political, inherited from father to son; it is not prescribed by passage of time or by signing any agreement and it cannot be abolished or waived in any way.

Article 4

A-    The Zionist occupation bears full responsibility for the political, legal, humanitarian and moral suffering of the Palestinian people and the lack of recognition of its right to self-determination.

B-    Britain bears historical responsibility for the suffering of the Palestinian people.

C-    The international community bears full responsibility for the lifting and removal of the suffering of the Palestinian people.

D-    The Palestinians have the right to sue the Zionist occupation and all who inflicted suffering to the Palestinian people and to demand compensation for physical or moral damages.

Article 5

The Palestinian refugees shall not be resettled or displaced as an alternative to the right of return.

Article 6

Anyone who violates the provisions of this Act shall be guilty of the crime of treason and will be subject to all criminal and civil penalties prescribed for this crime.

Article 7

Anything that contradicts this law is considered null and void, and any legislation or agreement that will derogate the right of return or contradict the provisions of this Act shall be deemed null and void.

Article 8

All competent authorities – each in his own jurisdiction – have to implement the provisions of this Act, and to act according to it as of the date of its publication in the Official Gazette.

Issued on: January 8, 2008 AD

Corresponding to: 29/Dhu al-Hija/1429 AH

Mahmoud Abbas

Chairman of the Executive Committee of the Palestine Liberation Organization

President of the Palestinian National Authority

*     *     *

Notes

1. http://www.jcpa.org/JCPA/Templates/ShowPage.asp?DBID=1&LNGID=1&TMID=111&FID=582&PID=0&IID=5393

2. http://www.dft.gov.ps/index.php?option=com_dataentry&pid=8&Itemid=27&des_id=1063

*     *     *

Lt. Col. (ret.) Jonathan D. Halevi is a senior researcher of the Middle East and radical Islam at the Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs. He is a co-founder of the Orient Research Group Ltd. and is a former advisor to the Policy Planning Division of the Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

It turned out the Iranians were in fact recruiting a U.S. federal agent in Mexico belonging to the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA); they transferred $100,000 to a U.S. account for a downpayment in order to hire what they thought was the second biggest drug cartel in Mexico, the Los Zetas. The Iranian agent discussed a plan to bomb a Washington restaurant when the Saudi ambassador was dining there. Did the Iranian effort to recruit an assassin from a Mexican drug cartel mean that the Revolutionary Guards had reason to believe that the Mexican drug lords could be relied upon to be dependable partners with Tehran? Perhaps the outreach to the Mexican drug cartels reveals that there were earlier connections with them that Iran was now trying to exploit.

For Israelis, the idea that Iran is active in Latin American is not new. The Israeli Embassy in Buenos Aires was bombed by Iran in 1992. Two years later, AMIA, the Jewish community center of Buenos Aires, was also bombed. The attacks brought attention to the triple frontier area between Paraguay, Argentina, and Brazil which had a considerable Lebanese Shiite population and was believed to have been penetrated by Hizbullah.

But since the 1990s, Iran has been systematically working its way up the continent of South America, perhaps with the purpose of establishing an operational infrastructure close to the southern border of the U.S., in a place like Mexico. Brigadier General Ahmad Vahidi, one of the masterminds of the AMIA attack, is now the Minister of Defense of Iran.

Thus, the Iranians and Hizbullah began expanding their South American network through Venezuela, which they used as a springboard throughout the region. Weekly flights of Iran Air from Tehran to Caracas began in 2007. The Iranians also built a massive embassy in Nicaragua – Secretary of State Hillary Clinton commented: “You can only imagine what that’s for.” In 2009, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates testified before Congress, saying, “I’m concerned with the level of, frankly, subversive activity the Iranians are carrying out in a number of places in Latin America.”

Iran expanded the number of its Latin American embassies from 6 in 2005 to 10 by 2010. A new study released in October 2011 by the American Enterprise Institute (AEI) in Washington claims that the Revolutionary Guards and Hizbullah today have 80 operatives working in 12 countries across Latin America. The study specifically quoted a 2007 Homeland Security Committee staff report that noted: “Members of Hezbollah, the Lebanon-based terrorist organization, have already entered the United States across our southwest border.”

Michael Braun, the former Chief of Operations of the DEA, already suggested in 2009 that Hizbullah was using the same smuggling routes into the U.S. as the Mexican drug cartels. A Mexican newspaper a year earlier leaked a DEA document claiming that the drug cartels were sending snipers to Iran for training with the Revolutionary Guards. The Mexican smuggling organizations were prepared to move Middle Easterners into the U.S.; thus, already in 2002 a resident of Tijuana moved a group of 200 Lebanese illegally into California, which included Hizbullah supporters.

Mexico has been working closely with the U.S. to thwart the infiltration of hostile Middle Eastern terrorist groups into the United States. But however hard both the U.S. and Mexico work against Iran and Hizbullah, the newest incident points to the need to be ever more vigilant in monitoring the Iranian threat to the U.S.